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Introduction of Matthew Goldstein 
by Ross Sandler, Professor of Law and Director of the Center  
for New York City Law:
The upcoming vote on the changes to the New York City Charter, proposed 
by the 2010 New York City Charter Revision Commission chaired by 
Matthew Goldstein, now Chancellor of the City University of New York, 
is a very important vote.1 Charter revision votes are exceedingly 
important because they write into our Charter, or do not write into our 
Charter, important and needed changes. For Mayor Michael Bloomberg, 
among the more important decisions is who is going to chair a Charter 
Revision Commission because the chair lends the personal dignity and the 
leadership to a Commission, and that is exceedingly important in getting 
results through the referendum process. And Mayor Bloomberg could not 
have made a better choice than Chancellor Goldstein.
* * * *
i. intrOdUCtiOn
 I’d like to walk through the accelerated journey that all of us on the 2010 Charter 
Revision Commission went through for about seven months to give a sense of the 
compressed time that we had to review the Charter and propose revisions, and how 
we came to some of the decisions that New York City voters will be reacting to on 
November 2, 2010.
 Most important, I will leave you with three words: turn it over. You have been 
reading about the ballots, and we are a little concerned about them. It is a new 
modality for voting. When you turn the ballot over, you will see that the fonts are 
quite small. So if you have a little extra thickness in your reading glasses, it will help, 
and make sure you use the magnifying glass that is made available to you.
 So let me begin by going back to a phone call that I received from Mayor 
Bloomberg in early February 2010. I speak to the Mayor on a fairly frequent basis, 
and I thought this was just another call about me asking him for money and his 
saying no. But it was not. He said he would like me to chair the Commission.
 I was delighted to help the Mayor. He appointed, in my estimation, a very 
distinguished group of women and men—fifteen of us, a diverse, highly committed 
group of Commissioners—and then let us do our job independently and without 
1. See N.Y.C. Charter Revision Comm’n, Final Report of the 2010 New York City Charter 
Revision Commission, at i (2010), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/charter/downloads/pdf/
final_report_of_the_2010_charter_revision_commission_9-1-10.pdf (“The 2010 Charter Revision 
Commission was appointed by Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg in March 2010. Dr. Matthew Goldstein, 
Chancellor of the City University of New York (CUNY), was appointed chair of the Commission, 
which consists of 14 other distinguished New Yorkers. The first act of the Commission was to hold five 
public hearings in the City’s five boroughs and to conduct an analysis of the public testimony. Based on 
this analysis, the commissioners resolved to further explore five broad areas: term limits, voter 
participation, public integrity, government structure, and land use.”).
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interference. I want to again publicly commend the Mayor for doing that. When he 
called me, he said, “you need to be independent; you know the areas of concern to 
the voters and the areas of concern to me, but do what you need to do.” I think that 
shows the dignity and commitment of our Mayor to a very important task.
 We had a very truncated time frame in which to do our work. I said very early to 
my fellow Commissioners that I believed it was essential that we bring something to 
the ballot in early November 2010. So, working back from there, we knew that we 
had a maximum of six months to do a thorough review of the Charter and then to 
bring forward proposed revisions that we thought were appropriate.
 We started our work with five public hearings in April, and then five issue 
forums in May and June. We brought in experts on term limits from around the 
country, including Richard Niemi2 and Patrick Egan.3 We wanted to look at voter 
participation, which is a systemic problem in New York; not enough people are 
coming out to vote. We heard from Jerry Goldfeder4 and Phil Thompson.5 We asked 
Eric Lane6 and Doug Muzzio7 to help us sift through the very difficult and changing 
landscape around government structure.
 We also felt that we needed to have some expert testimony on the issue of public 
integrity, which was an area that we had particular interest in. We asked Richard 
Rifkin8 and Richard Briffault9 to assist us in sifting through the substantive ideas. 
We got to land use and asked David Karnovsky10 and Paul D. Selver11 for guidance.
 We also solicited expert reports to help guide our work. The preliminary staff 
report was submitted to the Commission and released to the public in July, and it 
tried to encapsulate the essence of what we heard from hundreds and hundreds of 
people as we traversed the five boroughs.
 After that preliminary report was made public, we had open meetings in all five 
boroughs, which I thought was critically important, along with a special hearing of 
former Commissioners. There was an unprecedented outreach effort, and I think 
that if there is one defining principle for this Commission, it is that we utilized 
technological platforms that were not available to previous Charter Revision 
2. Richard Niemi is a Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester.
3. Patrick Egan is an Assistant Professor of Politics and Public Policy at New York University.
4. Jerry Goldfeder is Special Counsel for Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP.
5. Phil Thompson is an Associate Professor at MIT.
6. Eric Lane was the Executive Director of the 1989 Charter Revision Commission and is the Dean and 
Eric J. Schmertz Distinguished Professor of Public Law and Public Service at the Maurice A. Deane 
School of Law at Hofstra University.
7. Doug Muzzio is a Professor at the City University of New York.
8. Richard Rifkin is Special Counsel to the New York State Bar Association.
9. Richard Briffault is a Professor at Columbia University Law School.
10. David Karnovsky is General Counsel to the New York City Department of City Planning.
11. Paul D. Selver is a Partner and Co-Chair of the Land Use Department at Kramer Levin Naftalis & 
Frankel LLP.
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Commissions, including webcasts, webinars, Twitter, and Facebook. We did public 
service announcements in several languages, which were provided with the help of 
CUNY TV and Jay Hershenson.12 We really reached deep into communities, in a 
way that had never been done before.
II. FOUR PRINCIPLES FOR THE 2010 CHARTER REVISION COMMISSION
 Early on, I laid out four very basic operating principles that I thought were 
essential to give some structure to our deliberations. First, did we have enough time to 
study the issues? For me, due diligence was an operable principle. Did we have enough 
time to drill down deeply into the bedrock of the issues? If the answer was no, it was 
my view that we should put that issue aside and wait until we did have the time.
 Second, would we have enough time to educate the public? Today’s event is yet 
another step in educating the public. I spent many days with editorial boards and on 
television shows, radio programs, at interviews, and at public speaking engagements. 
This is the education phase of the Commission’s work. We were not advocating—
nor should we advocate—but we are obligated to educate, and if we can’t educate 
properly on an issue, then it’s not the right thing to bring to the ballot.
 Third, what was the likelihood of success? If we’re going to bring something to 
the ballot, we want to maximize the probability that we will be successful in gaining 
voter approval. This was probably the hardest part of the process because there’s a lot 
of judgment that we needed to depend upon.
 Last, will these results lead to a better-functioning government? I think this was 
the most overarching aspect of our work.
 Those were our four guiding principles. Remember, we had to finish our work by 
the end of August or the very beginning of September 2010 in order to meet the 
legal requirement of sixty days between the time we delivered our recommendations 
to the City Clerk and the vote on November 2, 2010.
III. ISSUES ADDRESSED BY THE 2010 CHARTER REVISION COMMISSION
 By August 2010, the Commission had agreed on a set of proposals to place before 
the voters. First, term limits. We knew de novo that term limits was going to be a lead 
result for us. It was not something that was debatable. We knew the voters expected us 
to address this, and we did. Never was there contentiousness, never was there acrimony, 
but spirited debate and passion were very much a hallmark of our discussions about the 
components of term limits. There were many on the Commission who were opposed to 
term limits. There were many who wanted to inoculate—and that was a word that I 
used—the Charter from intrusion. That is, how can we inoculate the Charter from 
behavior that we may not be supportive of? And the thing that surprised us all 
concerned implementation. Should there be immediate implementation of term limits 
or should there be a more gradual path toward implementation? Those issues were 
debated professionally and with great spirit.
12. Jay Hershenson is the Senior Vice Chancellor for University Relations at the City University of New 
York.
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 On the ballot in November we will have a term-limit question that has three 
components. First, it includes a limit of two four-year terms for elected officials 
applicable to officials first elected to office on or after November 2, 2010. Second, it 
also includes what I think is the most important part of the whole term-limit proposal: 
it prohibits on a going-forward basis the City Council from altering the term limits of 
elected officials then serving in office. We refer to that component of the term-limit 
provision as “prospectivity.” Never have we seen this before in the history of Charters 
in the City of New York. Third, it provides that the proposed two-term limit would 
apply to officials first elected to office on or after November 2, 2010.
 We also had to address a number of issues that were deferred by prior 
Commissions, and others that popped up that we thought we had sufficient time to 
address and satisfied our four principles. They all fall under a heading that I would 
call government transparency, efficiency, and integrity.
 There are seven of these that are bundled together, and I will talk in a moment 
about why we decided to bundle them.
 First, require disclosure of independent campaign expenditures in order to 
provide the public with more information about those expenditures. For example, 
require disclosure of which groups and individuals support or oppose certain 
candidates and political causes.
 Second, reduce the signature requirements for petitions, thereby expanding ballot 
access and increasing voter choice.
 Third, reconstitute the Voter Assistance Commission within the Campaign 
Finance Board—which has greater funding and an operating framework—in order 
to increase its impact, and rename the Voter Assistance Commission the Voter 
Assistance Advisory Committee and reduce it to nine members.
 Fourth, strengthen the city’s conflicts of interest law13 to establish mandatory 
training for public servants and increase penalties for violations from the current 
$10,000 to $25,000.
 Fifth, consolidate administrative tribunals into the city’s Office of Administrative 
Trials and Hearings in order to streamline operations.14
 Sixth, review reporting requirements and advisory bodies to ensure their 
usefulness, through a report and Advisory Board Review Commission.
 And last, amend the Fair Share Law15 to increase transparency of decisions by 
expanding the map showing the location and use of all city-owned real estate 
property to include the location of certain transportation or waste management 
facilities operated by the state or federal government. When I heard over and over 
again from people pleading with us—saying they are in communities overburdened 
by these kinds of facilities, that their children are sick, their elderly neighbors are 
13. N.Y.C. Charter §§ 2600–07.
14. Deputy Mayor Carol Robles-Román was very helpful to us as an expert in this field and really clarified 
the issues for the Commission.
15. N.Y.C. Charter §§ 203, 204.
48
Working ToWard a BeTTer-FuncTioning governmenT NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 58 | 2013/14
having respiratory and eye problems—I felt we needed to do something to disclose 
these locations in a much better way.
iV. prEparing thE VOtEr baLLOts
 In its deliberations, the Commission considered that the city would be using new 
ballot machines in November 2010. I know that some of you are interested in why 
we bundled the questions.16 We did so—especially question number two, which has 
seven discrete and non-overlapping provisions—because when you go to the polls on 
November 2, 2010 and turn that ballot over, you’re going to see a very small amount 
of space allotted to text. The font is going to be very, very small. So in order for us to 
include on the ballot the issues that we thought were important, we had to operate 
within physical constraints that we had no power to change. We wanted to have 
another page, but we were told early on that would not be possible. So we were left 
with a very, very small amount of space and had to make a judgment call.
 The literature is mixed on the propriety of bundling questions like this. Some say 
there’s no problem with it; others say there are correlation effects and that a voter’s 
answer to one component of the question may influence and bleed over to how the 
voter answers another component. It’s not a perfect system, but we made the judgment 
that we would move forward within the physical constraints we had.
 On the first question, about term limits, we deliberately put those three 
components together because we felt that term limits needed to be presented as a 
package, rather than as individual questions.
 That was not the case with question number two. Many of you probably thought 
we should have included non-partisan elections or “top two”17 on the ballot. I was 
very interested in moving ahead with non-partisan elections and having a really 
thorough discussion about it. I read every piece of literature and had certain concerns 
about the analytics of the literature—that is, the empirical evidence and how it would 
relate to New York City. I probably looked at more regression analyses than I have 
looked at since I taught regression analysis more than twenty years ago.
 There are really two essential reasons that we did not put non-partisan elections 
on the ballot this year. One, the Commission, almost unanimously, believed that it 
violated two of our operating principles. We didn’t have enough time to study the 
material; we couldn’t drill deep enough into the bedrock of the issue. Two, we 
thought the probability of success was going to be very small and, as another 
Commissioner said, even putting that aside, the negativity around the issue may 
affect people’s reaction to the other ideas that we had on the ballot.
 In addition, we had commissioned an expert on the matter of non-partisan 
elections to get the data that I thought was necessary for an analysis of the potential 
16. N.Y.C. Charter Revision Comm’n, 2010 Ballot Questions (2010), available at www.nyc.goc/html/
charter/downloads/pdf/final_ballot_questions_combined.pdf.
17. N.Y.C. Charter Revision Comm’n, supra note 1. A nonpartisan/top-two election is a primary election 
that allows voters to choose from all candidates for an office, regardless of the party affiliation of the 
voter or the candidate. The two candidates who receive the most votes face each other in the general 
election.
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effect on minority communities around the city. I was also deeply concerned about 
that, and felt that it was essential to have the data to inform this decision. But we 
could not get the data in time and that is why the issue of non-partisan elections is 
not on the ballot.
 Regarding land use, the only thing on the ballot is a very small component. We 
did not discuss the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP). We did not 
discuss the 197A provisions and all of the other provisions that I thought were 
important. We ran out of time. We did not want to bite off more than we could 
chew—that was an admonishment that we made very early on. We did not want to 
be too cavalier and assume that we knew an issue and accelerate our due diligence, 
when indeed we may not have understood the issues thoroughly.
 Another area that created great interest was government structure. The 
Commission instructed our executive director and staff to create a body of material 
about these three issues to hand over to the next Commission.
 So we asked the staff to put some work into these issues.18 Commissions are like 
relay races. You are given a task. You run as fast as you can with integrity and honesty 
and professionalism, and then, as those of you who are runners know, you run out of 
glucose. You stop, but you hand the baton to the next Commission, and for us the 
hand-off was non-partisan elections, government structure, and land use. We hope 
that the next Commission, whoever it is, will look at those three areas.
* * * *
QUEstiOn and ansWEr sEssiOn
 Question: Why did you allow for the newly elected members of the Council, the 
Public Advocate, and the Comptroller, if the question passes, to be permitted to 
serve for three terms and not two? It seems to be rewarding them for the bad acts of 
the Mayor and the former Council.
 Chancellor Goldstein: That is a great question and I’ll answer it very directly in 
two ways. First, none of us believed that our job was to affect policy based on punitive 
judgments that may or may not be entirely accurate. Some people have very strong 
views on what happened in 2008 when the City Council extended term limits, which 
permitted Mayor Bloomberg to seek re-election the following year, reversing prior 
voter referenda that had passed a limit of two four-year terms.19 We know that 
nothing was illegal and nothing was unethical. So while some may believe that we 
ought to punish people—and there’s a whole movement now to “throw the bums 
18. Chancellor Goldstein thanked Executive Director Lorna Goodman and her staff: Counsel Matthew 
Gordon, Trustee Judah Gribetz, General Counsel Frederick Schaffer, Senior Vice Chancellor Jay 
Hershenson, and Research Director Joseph Viteritti from the City University of New York; and 
Commissioners Carlo Scissura and Hope Cohen.
19. Edith Honan, NY Council Extends Term Limit So Bloomberg Can Run, Reuters, Oct. 23, 2008, http://
www.reuters.com/article/2008/10/23/us-newyork-bloomberg-idUSTRE49M70J20081023.
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out”—we didn’t operate that way, and I insisted that we would not operate that way. 
We were not about punitive work.
 I am more interested in long-term structural reform. Whether somebody has an 
interest in running for another term is, for me, trumped by the much bigger question 
about focusing on long-term structural reform.
 There was very passionate and spirited debate about the effective date of any 
term-limits law, and whether it should happen immediately or whether it should be a 
gradual change. I suggested a compromise, which somebody referred to as the 
Goldstein theorem—though I do not think I would want to be known for that 
theorem. The hybrid approach we suggested was really meant to serve as a bridge to 
bring together people who wanted a full grandfathering (whereby the term limits 
would not apply to anyone currently in office) as well as those who wanted immediate 
implementation (which would impose term limits prospectively as well as on anyone 
currently in office). At the end of the day, after many votes and lots of discussion, the 
Commission reported out unanimously, and that’s where we are.
 Question: One of the serious arguments against any term limits has been the lack 
of development of experience on the part of the City Council Members engendered 
by the revolving door of only two or three terms. Did the Commission at any point 
consider term limits only for either citywide officers or the chief executive as we 
indeed have in the federal government, where the term limits apply to the President 
but not Congress?
 Chancellor Goldstein: Yes, there was a lot of discussion about differentiation 
between terms for the executive branch (that is, people elected for city government 
overall, including the Public Advocate, Borough President, and certainly the Mayor) 
and terms for the City Council: three terms for City Council, two terms for the 
executive branch officials.
 The most interesting thing about the term-limit debate was that the vast majority 
of the members of the Commission are publicly opposed to term limits. They believe 
it limits voter choice and that we should not do it. But we understood that, by 
accepting to sit on this Commission, we would bring back for referendum the 
question of whether voters want to go back to the term limits that were in place 
before 2008. That is what we did, and that is what you are going to be voting on.
 Question: I would like to speak to you about a question involving term limits that 
I do not think has been the focus of much attention. I would like to examine the 
proposal through the lens of your fourth principle: Will it lead to a better-functioning 
government? One of the most difficult things to get public officials to do is to think 
about the long term, especially when it relates to budgetary matters. Rather, their 
instinct is to accelerate revenues and postpone expenditures. It is the worst possible 
instinct, and it seems to me that term limits institutionalize the worst instincts of 
public officials.
 Chancellor Goldstein: Let me use a metaphor that I think answers your question. I 
viewed term limits as an infinite series that does not converge. For those of you who 
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remember pre-calculus, you may understand this. I think that if I come back here in 
twenty years we will still be having the same arguments about term limits. It is an 
argument that is not going to converge. People are not going to be happy about 
anything we do because they have such strong views. I have my own personal views. I 
am not a supporter of term limits, but I am going to vote for this provision because I 
feel that this is the right thing for city governance at this particular time. But I can 
debate the other view just as eloquently, and that is why I do not think we will ever get 
a final answer that will satisfy the vast majority of the people. There are very strong 
views on all sides of this question. If this passes,20 we will live with it for a while, and 
then I would not be surprised if in a few years people will ask to revisit and reshape it. 
That is part of what is wonderful about living in a democracy.
 Question: Let me ask a follow-up on that. According to the provision as I 
understand it, the Council can still change the term-limits law. So you did not 
actually change that. How did the Commission think about this? Were there some 
who thought that the Council should never have the power to amend any term-limits 
law?
 Chancellor Goldstein: Here’s where I have to defer to the lawyers. Yes, even with 
the prospectivity component that we included in the ballot question, the Council can 
still change the term limits, but it is going to be much more difficult for the Council 
to do that given what we have provided in the Charter. Does the proposed Charter 
revision inoculate itself against the Council changing term limits in the future? No, 
but the lawyers told us that any inoculation would not stand up to a legal challenge. 
That said, I think it will be difficult for members of the City Council to change the 
term-limits provision if indeed it passes in November.
 Question: I was curious about your discussion regarding research because it has 
always struck me that many of these issues—and term limits is perhaps one of the 
best examples—are very difficult to research. So the question on some of these issues 
really is whether you could give some indication of the kind of research that the 
Commission had access to and that informed some of the recommendations that you 
were making.
 Chancellor Goldstein: This is a great question. I come from a world where, when 
research is done, it is done. You know that the theorem was proven, and that is it. In 
social science research, there is never a final answer, and that is why I say that there 
is no convergence. You do your best by looking at the data at a certain point in time. 
But those sands are constantly shifting. So you cannot come up with a definitive 
decision in 2008 and assume that it is going to be applicable a few years later because 
so many of the variables are shifting. That is the nature, excitement, and beauty of 
20. The Commission’s term limits proposal passed. See N.Y.C. Charter Revision Comm’n, http://www.
nyc.gov/html/charter/html/home/home.shtml (last visited July 3, 2013) (“The 2010 Charter Revision 
Commission has concluded its work after successful approval by the voters of its two ballot proposals on 
November 2, 2010.”).
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social science research: it allows you to constantly refresh what you are doing and 
take a better look. 
 The best social science research is that which enables you to make conclusions 
that have as long a time span as possible. We believe in the research that we examined 
in order to make our recommendations. The time span was maximized, but it will 
not last forever. In contrast, we all know Fermat’s last theorem was proven.21 We 
know it’s over.
 Question: Because of the grandfathering component of the term-limits law, many 
of the revisions discussed today are not going to take effect until 2021 and will 
ultimately benefit just thirty-three elected officials. Addressing that seems to be the 
reason that this Charter Commission was put together in the first place—that is, the 
public felt strongly that the Mayor and the City Council had done an end-run around 
the will of the people when they overturned referenda that the people passed in 1993 
and 1996. I don’t feel that this grandfathering addresses the underlying reason why 
this Charter Commission was put together in the first place.
 Chancellor Goldstein: It takes effect fully in 2021, but in two years about nineteen 
members of the Council are going to have completed their terms independent of what 
we did. Just a couple of years after that, another group will leave. The group that it 
primarily affects is the group of people who were elected in 2009 because, after they 
complete their first term, they will have an opportunity for two additional terms.
 I think it is better if you think of this as a gradual path, rather than concluding 
that it does not take effect until 2021. That is an incorrect statement. It takes effect 
fully by 2021, but, long before you get there, a large number of City Council Members 
will have exhausted their opportunity to run for re-election.
21. See David Hart, 350 Years Later, Fermat’s Last Theorem Finally Proved, Nat’l Science Found. (Sept. 21, 
2004), http://www.nsf.gov/discoveries/disc_summ.jsp?cntn_id=100029&org=NSF.
